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Clarifying Poli(~y 
From its modern ongms more than thirty years ago federal merger pol-
icy has centered around the use of standard surrogates for market power 
to make presumptions about the likely effects of mergers. Since that time 
it has been evolving towards an increasingly complex approach as eco-
nomic considerations have expanded their influence on merger policy. 
This trend was solidified in the 1982 revision of the Department of 
Justice's Merg(~r Guidelines, accelerated by the Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines' increased 
emphasis on unilateral (as opposed to collusive) anticompetitive effects,1) 
and has reached new heights in the last few years with new unilateral 
*Portions of this article were presented to Nihon University College of Law's International 
Antitrust Law and Economics Seminar in July 28, 1998. Dr. Langenfeld was the economic expert 
representing variolls private parties in most of the recent transactions discussed in this article. This 
article incorporatf's. ('>xknds, r~\'ises and updates tlw authors' earlier piece~ '~From Surrogates to Sto-
ries: The Evolution of Federal Merger Policy," II Antitrust 5 (1997). Material from this piece was 
incorporated into this artielc with the permission of the American Bar Association. The authors are 
grateful to Alan S. Frankel for man)' of the insighLs concerning the Staples/Office Depot case that 
appear in this article. to Steve StockulIl for man)' of the insights concerning the use of consumer 
complaints in merger analysis, and to Kunal Bhaumik for exceptional research assistance. 
\) Sec. e.g., Paul T. Denis, Adm"""s of the ]992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the Analysis of 
Competitiz'" Effects, 38 Antitrust Bull, ,179 (1993). 
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theol'ies and the application of econometric analysis of market data and 
game-theory based simulation programs. In effect, merger policy has been 
moving away from reliance on surrogates and towards an approach that 
instead tells an economics-based story of anti competitive harm - an 
approach that directly asks and answers the ultimate question: are prices 
to consumers likely to increase as a result of a merger? This new 
approach can lead to surprising conclusions. Many of these issues will be 
illustrated through the analysis of a merger enforcement action that was 
the largest, most economically complex, and among the most controver-
sial ever brought by the Federal Trade Commission-its challenge to the 
Staples/Office Depot transaction. 
I. The Traditional Approach 
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 372 U.S. 321 (1963), one 
of the first modern merger cases,2) held that the government must deflne 
the relevant market and prove appropriate market share and market con-
centration data. If the government proved these surrogates for market 
power, the Supreme Court was willing to declare a presumption of illegal-
ity that would control unless defendant "clearly" could overcome it. Td. at 
363. Once the government had defined the relevant market and showed 
an appropriate increase in concentration the case was virtually over and 
the merger would be enjoined .. 3) As we have learned over the last thirty 
years, the traditional approach has many problems. For example, market 
definition can be an all or nothing game and ean determine whether a 
merger will be challenged. Suppose, for example, that two manufacturers 
of luxury automobiles, such as Mercedes and BMW, want to merge. If the 
"relevant market" were considered to be "all new automobiles, ,,~) the 
merger would probably be regarded as harmless since their market shares 
would be trivial. On the other hand, if there were such a thing as a "lux-
ury car markt't," the mt'rgt'r might involvt' unduly high market shares 
and could thus be challenged and prevented. 
Unfortunately, the methods for and evidence of market determination 
seldom lead to unambiguous market definitions. Accordingly, the conven-
tional approach can lead to little predictability in "heterogeneous" or 
2) In some ""spects, such as requiring market definitions, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, :170 
U.S. 2')4. (I962), can h" considered tlw first modern merger case. 
:3) The list of factors that could O\','rturn the clear presumption was rdatiwly short and, in tlw 
y(~ars immediately after the decision, rarely used . 
. t) This was the market definition used by the 1;1'C in evaluating the GM-'J(»),ota joint venture in 
1984, I();) ETC. :374 (191J.J.). 
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"diHerentiated" markets composed of products with substantially different 
features and prices, such as automobiles, or with significant brand distinc-
tion and (arguably) less obvious product differences, such as bath tissues. 
This problem can be serious because one can almost always find enough 
differences in products to make an argument that any market is heteroge-
neous. The traditional approach to this problem, at least prior to the 
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, was to decide how close the products 
of the merging firms are in a produet market space, and make this a 
qualitative "plus" or "minus" factor in the analysis. 
Another problem with Philadelphia National Bank's presumptive 
approach is that every merger involves different competitive circum-
stances that can affect whether a merger is likely to reduce competition. 
Even if one can establish that a merger would result in a post-merger 
industry Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI) over 1800 and an increase 
of more than 100, these calculations by themselves seldom accurately 
predict whether competition will be harmed by the merger. For example, 
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), held that 
current production of coal was a poor measure of future competition and 
that uncommitted coal reserves should be used instead.S) Cases such as 
United States v. l17aste Management, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983), rev'd, 743 E2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984), recognized the importance of 
potential entry as a check on post-merger market power,6) and United 
States v. Country Lake Foods, 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 69,113 (D. 
Minn. 1990), highlighted the impact of powerful buyers in counteracting 
increased seller concentration after a merger. Perhaps for these reasons, 
Philadelphia National Bank's presumptive approach has eroded over time. 
For example, in Uni.ted States v. Marine Bancoporation, Inc., 4,] 8 U.S. 
602, 631 (1974), the Supreme Court reartieulated the formulation, but 
omitted "clearly" from the presumption. Moreover, even the word "pre-
sumption" may now be debatable. In United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 
731 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. ]990), Judge 
Thomas arguably abolished the presumption completely,7) although the 
presumption does remain in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
5) One can also argue that the court merely disagreed with the way market shares should IH' 
calculated, hut the ease does focus on future actions rather than on current sales. 
6) See Makoim Coate & James Langenfeld, Entry Under the Merger Guidelines 1982-1992. 38 
Antitrust Bull. 557 (1993) (discussing history of entry analysis in the courts). 
7) Judge Thomas held that despite Philadelphia National Bank. "The ultimati' hurden of per-
suading the trier of fact ... remains at all times with the plaintiff. ... " Baker Hughes. 'lOR 1'.2<1 at 
991 (citation omitted). 
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II. Recent Government Approaches 
Regardless of whether a presumption still exists under case law, the 
federal enforcers today do not merely define a relevant market, show the 
relevant market shares and HHI figures, and rest their case. Using a vari-
ety of economic models and techniques/I) federal enforcers are attempting 
to develop additional information that would shed light on whether a 
merger is likely to be anticompetitive.q) In particular, there have been 
many recent attempts by the Federal Trade Commission and the Depart-
ment of Justice to shift the focus of investigations away from market defi-
nition, particularly in cases involving unilateral effects. 10) Their approach 
is to return to first principles. Since the enforcers ultimately care about 
the firm's ability to raise prince after a merger, they look at a variety of 
factors and try directly to predict what will happen to future industry 
prIces. 
In the extreme, this means forgetting about market definition, market 
shares, and other surrogates of market power. As the fonner Director of 
the Bun~au of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission Jonathan 
Baker suggests, so long as the price of something is likely to rise, why 
should we waste time figuring out exactly what prices will go Up'?II) To 
use an example that Baker has used in the past, there might be an 
extreme case when we do not care exactly how the beer market is 
defined or what the precise market shares are e.g., whether "lite" beer or 
8) 111e economic literature in this area has heen developed and refint'd over many years and is 
too extensive to discuss here. The authors of important articles in the field include current and for-
mer Department of Justice and vre economists, including Jonathan Baker, Luke Froeb, Thomas 
OrerstreeL George Hozanski, Greg Werden, Carl Shapiro. and Rohert Willig. 
For example, see Thomas Cherstreet et aI., Understanding Econometric Analysis of Price Effed,s of 
JIergers Invoi1'ing Differentiated Products, Antitrust, Summer 1990, at :W, and Carl Shapiro, Mergers 
with DifJprentinted PrOr/llcts, Antitrust, Spring I <)90, at 23. 
9) We only discus,; the price effects of mergers. Others have suggested that merger enforcement 
should have additional concerns, but these are beyond the scope of this article. See Hobert II. 
Lunde, l1'0alth 'I;-on,~fers as the Originol and Primary Concern of Antitmst: TIll! FJficienl), Intapreta-
tion Chol/enged, 3·t Hastings 1.1. 05, 137-40 (1982). 
10) It is un dear why the gort'rtllllt'nt has placed a rcnewed emphasis on unilateral eHeets. In 
part, it is probably due to economic theory's increast'd focus on the topic and the agcnci('s' bdicf 
that collusion or other forms of coordination may either be unlikely to occur in diHerentiated mar-
keb or merely diftlcult to prore absent evidence that it has occurred in the past in a market under 
irn""tigation. '111t' difficultv of collusion or of demonstrating it has been highlighted by the Supreme 
Court in Brookt' (;roup, Ltd. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. 1:33 S. Ct. 2,578 (I 99:j). 
II) Jonathan B. Baker, Prodllct Differentiotion throllgh Spoce alld 'Ilme: Some Antitm"t Po Ii,} 
/SSIl(,S, Presentation to the Antitrust and 'lI'ad" Heglllatioll Committee of the Ass'n of the Bar of the 
City of N.!'. (Feb. 6, 1996). 
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imported beer should be included in the relevant market. 12) If Anheuser-
Busch and Miller were to merge and the price of something (even if we 
have not defined precisely what it is) probably will increase, then the 
agencies should take this as direct evidence of reduced competition and 
attempt to stop the merger.' 
Other antitrust scholars and practitioners, such as Gregory Werden, 
argue that economic simulations based on estimates of own-and cross-
price elasticities of demand should be used instead of analysis that cen-
ten; around ,;tructural surrogate:;Yl) In fact, the government in ib internal 
deliberations frequently has used this type of analysis to predict directly 
profit-maximizing priee increases. At a minimum, this new method of 
analysis means an inereased focus on the nature of competition between 
the merging firms and their close substitutes, paying particular attention 
to the likely effects of the merger on groups of customers. I .I) 
III. Ideology or Improved Economic Tools? 
There is concern in the U.S. antitrust defense bar that economic story 
telling and the increased foeus on unilateral effects analysis will lead to 
overly narrow market definitions, or no market definition at all. Some 
believe that the old Bnnvn Shoe submarket coneept has returned, albeit 
disguised by new eeonomic language, I,») or there is an attempt to avoid 
the statute's reference to a "line of commerce." 
For example, in United States 1'. Interstate Bakeries Corp., Civ. Action 
No. 95C 4194 (N.D. ill. filed July 20, 1995), the government alleged that 
the relevant product market was "white pan bread baked by wholesale 
and captive bakeries sold through retail food stores," and that the merger 
"would likely cause interstate to raise its prices for white pan bread sold 
under its brands and the brands it is acquiring from Continental [such as 
Wonder or Webers]" (emphasis added). According to the Department of 
12) /d, at .5-7. 
13) Gregory 1. Werden, Simulating Unilateral Effect" from Differentiated Products Mergers. II 
Antitrust 27 (1997). 
14) With respect to the focus on groups of "ustomer,. thc recent government approaches follow 
the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines' analysis of markets defined by the ability to price differently 
to different groU[" of customer. Sec §§ 1.12 IS 1.22. 
IS) There is little douht that Brown Shoe was incorrectly decided, but the reasons for this are 
not necessarily related to its basic approach to market definition. See John L. Peterman. The BTfJH.'T! 
Shoe Case, 18 1.L. & Econ, 81 (1975), In some ways, Brown Shoe's approach to market definition 
foreshadows the more recent approaches of pstimating f~lastieities of demand: "The outer boundaries 
of a product market are determined hy the reasonable interchangeability of use or ihe cross-elastic-
ity of demand Iwtwecn the product itself and substitutes for it." Brown Shoe Co. v. Unitd States. 
370 U.S. 29,~ (1962). 
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Justicc, bread baked in stores' bakeries was not to be included in the 
same relevant market as branded bread, and store-brand white pan bread 
(such as Safeway), rolls, hearth baked, wheat, rye, diet, ete., breads would 
be unlikely to constrain a price increase in branded white pan hreads 
after the merger. By contrast, during the Reagan Administration, the FTC 
considered the same market in Flowers Industries, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1700 
(1983), hut alleged "[the] relevant product market for each acquisition ... 
is the manufacture and sale of bread and bread-type rolls produced by 
wholesale bakeries, grocery chain bakeries, and in-store bakeries," where 
"bread shall mean white, wheat, rye, dark or variety baked bread prod-
ucts" and "bread-type rolls shall mean hamburger and hotdog rolls, 
brown and serve rolls, English muffins, hearth rolls, and similar prod-
uets." lei. at 170], 1705. Thus, market definition and competitive analysis 
have shifted over the last decade. This would be desirable if the approach 
taken a decade ago resulted in markets that were too broad. After all, if 
the government could show that a merger would increase the price of 
"branded white bread" by 10 percent for a significant period of time, 
then the merger should be enjoined. 
The government's new method of analysis is, however, not inherently 
pro-plaintiff. In many ways it was originated by Posner and Landes in 
198].ltJ) Posner and Landes pointed out that if it were possible to calcu-
late elasticity of supply and elasticity of demand, we could forgo market 
definition and market share because we would know everything we 
needed to know to assess a merger's competitive impact. However, 
because we cannot know this very often, we must instead use the tradi-
tional methods of calculating the surrogates of relevant market and mar-
ket shares, and making presumptions. Ii) The government's new approach 
is saying, in effect, that enforcers agree with Landes's and Posner's overall 
methodology, but that economic theory, econometric techniques, data 
availability,18) and developments in computer simulations have improved 
so much in the last fifieen wari'. we can now often answer Landes's and 
" . 
Posner's direct question. Werden suggests that in those cases where we 
ean answer the direct question and calculate likely price increases, we 
should do that, instead of using traditional structural analysis. 19) 
In addition to its provenance, another reason why this approach is not 
16) William Landes & Hiehard Posner, Market Pm .. er in Antitrust Ca8e8, 94 lIan'. L Hey. 937 
(l91l 1). 
17) Jd, at 938, 94t 
Ill) These data have ("ome from "'lin'," slIeh as Nielsen's and lHrs ,eamler-based price and 
fjuantity data on retail :;ales. 
19) See \Vf'nbl, .IIII'm note 1:1, at 27 .. :l0. 
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necessarily pro-plaintiff is that it sometimes can bc used to weigh in favor 
of the legality of a merger under the right circumstances. In another 
recent merger of two bread bakeries, for example, one of thc bakeries 
specialized in pan bread, while the other specialized in hearth bread. 
After an extensive analysis, the Department of Justice decided not to chal-
lenge the merger because, among other reasons, it was shown that the 
products of the two bakeries were not each other's closest competitor in 
retail sales.20) Accordingly, these recent developments may provide more 
bases for challenging mergers, but there does not appear to be an ideo-
logical bias involved in the government's new methodology. 
IV. Disadvantages of the Trend 
'Ine new methodologies have a number of disadvantages, which may 
weigh against their use in spite of their lack of ideological bias and their 
widespread support. First, there are often problems with obtaining the 
necessary underlying data in a form that is of sufficient quality.21) Second, 
assuming that the data are available and reliable, discussions with the 
agencies often turn into a battlc of the applicable economic assumptions, 
econometric analysis, and computer simulation. models. For example, is 
the market better categorized as homogeneous or dif'f'erentiated, is the 
finn's competition based on quantity (Cournot game-theory models) or 
pnce (Bertrand game-theory models), or any game theory model at all'?22) 
20) Although (wu products do not need to be each other's dosest competitors for the analysis to 
predict a price increase~ as eonSllmers plac(> more products Hin-between~~ those of the merging firm~. 
(his will knd to reduce the magnitudc of (he projected price inerea:-('. See Shapiro. supra note 8. 
The ])epat1ment of .Justice appears willing (0 allow a merger bdow sOllle level of projected pric(' 
increas(? (as yet undefined). 
2J) For example, scanner data can provide a great deal of detailed price and quantity data by 
week. 'l1lCse data are now virtually always used in mergers involving produels sold at supermarkets 
and drug stores, such as the bakery mergers discussed above and the recent merger between Kim-
berly Clark and Scott. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 71, ·tOS 
(N.D. Tex. 1996) (consent decree). Even with the availability of these data, however, there can lw 
still be problems. For example, are coupons, returns, and rebates accurately factored in? When scan-
lIer data are not available, there are usually substantially more problems with obtaining accurate 
price and quantity data-although economisl, such as Baker, Werden, and Shapiro have suggested 
ways to infer some of the critical information. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, "Unilateral Competitive 
Eff(,,,!:; Tlworics in Merger Analysis. II Antitrust 21 (I ')')7): Gregory .J. \\helen, Simulating Cni/ot-
eral Competitive Effects .from Differentiated Products Mergers, II Antitrust 27 (1997): Shapiro, supra 
note 8. 
22) The author of a recent article questioning the increased complexity of economic theories 
quotes the eminent Stanford game theorist David Kr('ps as saying, "Noncooperative galTl<' tfwory ... 
has had a great run in economics over the past decade or h\'o ... we (economic tlworists and ~cono­
mists more broadly) ,,,,cd to keep a better sense of proportion about where and when to lise it:' 
John Cassidy, 771(' Decline of' Economics. New Yorker, Dec. 2, 1996, at 37, 58. 
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What does one assume about the shape of the demand curves, the group-
ing of products in a demand system, and the structure of the demand 
estimation process?2:l) What are the relevant time periods?21) Which simu-
lation model should we use?2S) Is proliuct repositioning (a form of entry) 
easy?26) Virtually all of these models always predict prices will reise as a 
result of a merger without any explicitly collusive behavior (absent signif-
icant efficiencies).27) Accordingly, what level of predicted price increase is 
sufficient to merit challenging a merger? Different ansWers to these and 
other technical questions may lead to predictions of either a de minimis 
or a significant price increase from a merger, so the government's analysis 
risks being fragile. Spelling out in detail the assumptions is very useful, as 
long as decision maker understand the assumptions and their importance. 
However, if one can change the analysis substantially by making fair hilt 
different assumptions, or if the analysis is based on relatively small differ-
ences in statistical estimates, the government's approach is unlikely to be 
very useful. 
2:3) Any projection of price increases after a merger can be signilicantly affected by the assump-
tion that there i:-i a constant elastieity instead of a linear demand curve. A linear demand curve 
assumes that the quantity of demand will fall by the same amount for a gin,n dollar price increase, 
regardless of the current level of "ales. That is, the decrease in the number of units demanded 
divided by a one dollar increase in price equals a constant. Constant elasticity of demand assumes 
that there will be a constant percentage decrease in the quantity demand for a given percentage 
increase in price. In general, linear demand curves lead to predictions of smaller price increases 
than constant elasticity drInand curves. !\lol'cover, the grouping of products into like eategories prior 
to the econometric analysis fre(jllCntly affeets estimates of how closely products compete. In fact, 
whether the econometric analysis directly estimates the elasticity of demand or does this indirectly 
through the impact of price on market shares can also greatly affect til" results. 
2,1.) Flastieity and firm I",havior can also vary greatly over time, so it is crucial to choose the 
time period correctiy. 
25) Altcrnativc simulation models can give substantially different results. Compare Gregory .J. 
Werden & Luke M. Froeh, Simulation (l-S (/1/ Altematire to Structural Merger Polit,r in Differentiated 
Product., Induscries, in Competition Policy Enforcement: 'l1lC Economics of the Antitrust Process 
(Malcolm Coate & Andrew K1eit eds., I YYbj, with Jerry Hausman el aI., Compecicit·e Analysis H·itit 
Differentiated Products, 34 Annales d'Economic et de Statisti'lue 15<) (I <)<).j.). 
26) For example: if we are worried ahout a merger of two country and western radio stations, 
how difficult would it he for a classical radio station to reposition itself and enter the country and 
western nich('~ Although the 19<)2 Horizontal Merger Guidelines would presumably treat this as 
""uncommitted" entry, and therefore it would he part of the agencies' hurden of proof in market def-
inition, "the agell"y staffs fre'jtH'ntiy try to plac<~ the burden of proof on the advocates of the merger 
to show that other products should be included in the market share calculations." James Lang<'nfeld, 
TIll' \Ierger Guidelines as .'\pplied, in Kleit & Coate. supra IIote 22, at .j.1, ·~6. The recent approaches 
make this analysis even more critical, and there is ongoing research on this i~su('. See Cregory \V('>r-
den & Luke Fnwh. 771C EntTy-Inducing Jffecls of Horizontol }[ergers. I'ap<·r I'n'sented at till' Ameri-
l'(ll/ Economic Association Meelings, New Orleans, La. (Jan. 1997). 
27) These models predict prices will increase as long as there is at least some suhstitutahility 
betwt'<'1l the products of the JJJI'rl-~ng linn:, (a positiVI' cros~-eiasticity of d,~J)JaJld). 
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Third, the methodology may be less predictable than traditional market 
definition analysis. There is clearly uncertainty with both the 1992 Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines approach to market definition and these recent 
approaehes. 2B) However, faced with a client that wishes to merge with a 
competitor, a defense lawyer might be in a position of saying "it depends 
on the assumptions about the shape of' the demand curve." Moreover, it 
is not clear how often the government will be able to meet its burden of 
proof in court given the data and methodological issues. Many of the new 
economic approaches being used by the antitrust agencies have not been 
really tested in litigation, and the courts could substantially affect the 
influence these new approaches have on merger policy and analysis.2<)) 
Thus, the new unilateral effects analysis may lead to less business cer-
tainty, with all the negatives that flow from lower predictability. 
A fourth drawback is that this new analysis can be time consuming 
and expensive, especially when the merf,ring parties attempt to challenge 
the government's analysis or attempt to use these approaches to dissuade 
the ageneies from challenging a merger. It can often cost hundreds of 
thousands of' dollars to do a complete analysis in a particular case, 
and the analysis moves even more from existing ease law to tlw realm 
of economists. 
V. Practical Impact on Policy 
One of the most important practical effects of the government's ne,,\, 
approaeh is that it often can find unilateral anti competitive effects at very 
low combined market shares. Dr. Jonathan Baker provides an example of 
how a merger can lead to a 12.5 percent price increase even though the 
firms' combined market share is only 20 percent.30) Thus, it should come 
as no surprise that assumptions similar to those contained in the govern-
ment's models can produce many scenarios involving combined market 
shares of even less that 20 percent that predict price increases of' more 
than 10 percent. In fact, this type of analysis can predict price increase 
from 6 percent to over 50 pereent after the merger of two firms that 
each have only 5 percent of' a hypothetical market. Under reasonable 
28) Attorneys or business people might have problems defining an antitrust market without 
extensive analysis. but might have a good idea about which companies arc their closest competitors. 
Under these conditions, it is not dear whether the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guiddines or the new 
approach would ereate more uncertainty. 
29) One case that has grappled in' detail with some of these issues is New York \. Kraft Gen. 
Foods, Inc .• 926 F. SlipI" 321 (S.D.N.!'. 1995). 
30) Jonathan J3. Baker, Unilateral Comp"titi,." Fiji>('t., 'I7lCories in Merger Anal"si." II Antitrust 
21 (1997). 
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assumptions, the new approach can predict significant price inereases with 
what most would eonsider small market shares. Do the Merger Guidelines 
permit a eonsideration of unilateral .effects when the finns' combined 
market shares is this small'? Many in the antitrust bar belieV(' that the 
Merger Guidelines eontain a general safe harbor for unilateral effeets 
when the combined market shares total less than .3.5 percent, but it is 
clear from Baker's analysis that many antitrust enforcers do not believe 
this. The Merger Guidelines state in Sections 2.211 and 2.22 that there 
will be no presumption of unilateral effects if the merged firm has less 
than a .3.5 percent market share, but this does not neeessarily mean that a 
safe harbor exists if there is evidence that the merging finns are each 
other's closest competitor. Is challenging mergers with combined market 
shares of less than .3.5 percent based on noncollusive theories consistent 
with past enforcement praeticer As a practical matter, it represents a dra-
matic change from the Reagan-Bush years. 
For example, from 1987 to 1992 the Federal Trade Commission chal-
lenged only four mergers (out of a total of 61 challenges) that involved 
an H HI increase of less than 400.:ll ) We would be surprised if any of the 
challenged transactions involved combined market shares as low as 20 
percent. Om experience suggests that during the Heagan years many 
enforcers believed that for a firm to have the power to unilaterally raise 
price and restriet output it would usually have to have more than .50 per-
cent of a market, and even in those eireumstances market power often 
was negated by ease of entry, repositioning, contestability, etc. Now the 
debate has shifted dramatieally. The federal enforcers are not only con-
cerned with market shares over .50 pereent, but at least some appear 
concerned with combined market shares in the 20-.3.5 percent range. 
Economists differ over whether this mirrors the real world. Many 
economists continue to believe that substantial market power, when it 
exists at all, requires market shares well over .50 percent.:l2) Others believe 
that market power can begin in the .30-40 percent rangp.:l:l) If one holds 
this latter view, the government's new policy could he justified by 
the incipiency mandate of Section 7 of the Clayton Act-depending on 
how far the government and courts are willing to take tlwse theories. 
;) 1) ,\iall A. Fi,lwr & Hobert II. Lanll<" I'roposing a SIrt1clllred Hejimllllialioll of'lhe COlllpam-
lire/\' Cllpreriiclahle 1992 Merger Guidelines, Paper Presented Before the ABA .\ntitrust Section 
Annual \kt?ting 7-1! (Aug. ]0. 1992). Only O1l1' of Ihese ehalleng,,, inml\'eti an HilI inen"l><' of [p" 
than ;)00. Ii is nnclear whetlwr any of those 1'0111' ehali,'nges iu\"OJl'ed IInilateral effects anall'sis. 
32) See Dellnis Carlion ,~ J"ffn'l' I'"rioff. ~Iodern Indllstrial Organization no:) (19 IH). 
:B) See John E. Kwoka . .II'., 'lhe Efji'ci of :\1arkel Share lJi.~lrihlllioll on IntiusllT Performllnce. 61 
H,·,. Emn. & Stat. 1. 101 (I'),f)). 
r 
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VI. Testing the New Approach in Court 
Ever since Philadelphia National Bank, merger enforcement has been 
moving away from a mechanical approach using surrogates and presump-
tions towards one that directly attempts to answer the ultimate question 
of whether price is likely to increase hecause of a merger. This trend has 
been accelerating recently, and it is not clear how far the agencies will 
take it or whether a court would ever go all the way and forgo the use of 
market definition, market share, and concentration. In the Department of 
Justice's failed attempt to challenge the acquisition of the Parker Pen 
Company by the Gillette Company, its expert economic witness concluded 
that the merger was anti competitive without including an analysis that 
defined a relevant market.:H ) Would a court now adopt Baker's approach 
and conclude that the price of something is likely to rise by 12..5 percent, 
so never mind exactly what the relevant market is? Such an approach is 
contrary to long established case law, such as Philadelphia National Bank, 
which holds that it is first necessary to define the relevant market and 
calculate market shares. And, of course, the Merger Guidelines would 
have to be amendt'd because they now assert that the govt'rnm(~nt will 
start its analysis by deJining the relevant market. If the government is 
going to test the extreme version of its approach in court and assert that 
it did not have to de!ine the relevant market or calculate concentration 
or market shares, then it should challenge a merger that is the equivalent 
of Coca-Cola buying Pepsi. This is probably the only way the government 
could convince a court to ignore the traditional surrogates and find 
potential harm to a relatively undefined "line of cornmerce.":l's) If how-
ever, the government's analysis hinges on an economic model that shows 
a significant anticompetitive effect when there is a constant ('la~t icity 
demand eurve, but a straight line demand curve predicts only a de min-
imis price increase, it is unlikely that any court will hold that the govern-
34,) United States y. Gillette Co" 1993-1 Trade Cas, (Cell) ~ 70, 210 (D.C Cif. 19'Xl) (Georl''' 
A, Rozanski, Declaration in the proposed acquisition of the Parker Pen Company by the Gillette 
Company). 
35) By analogy, tl)(· a!templed monopolization standard in Ill<' Ninth Circuit used to be similar 
to what some economists and government officials are considering in the merger area. Lessig v, 
Tidewater Oil Co,. 317 F.:2d .J,59 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 327 U.S. 993 (I !)(d,) (in certain cases mar-
kct dcfinition is "not an issue"), Many Sherman Act cases do nol appear to require plaintiff 10 prove 
a relevant market and market share. or market concentration, As the Court noted in SpedrulIl 
Sports, Inc. v, McQuillan. 113 5, Ct. 884 (1993), however. "single firm activity is unlikP concerted 
activity covered by § I. which inherently is fraught with anticoml'etitivc risk. For these ""asons. § :2 
makes the cundue! of a single threalens to do so." Id, at B92 (citation omitted). \\'" Iwlicv(' that 
merger analysis bas('d 011 unilaleral anticoIllpetiti\"t· effects is morp analogous to monopolization 
analysis that; 10 § I analysis, 
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ment had met its burden of persuasion. Accordingly, we would expect 
that this approach would at least initially be tested in court in conjunc-
tion with a traditional structural analysis. 
VII. A State of the Art Example: The Staples/Office Depot 
Merger:l6) 
Perhaps the most visible example of the recent trent toward economics-
based merger analysis is the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's suceessfill 
challenges to the proposed merger between Staples and Office Depot. In 
September 1996, United States office supply retailer Staples, Inc. agreed 
to acquire rival Office Depot in an acquisition valued at $3.4 billion. Sta-
ples and Office Depot are two of the three office supply 'superstore' 
chains in operation in the United States (the third is Office Max). They 
compete head-to-head in 4.2 metropolitan areas in the United States 
today, and each has been expanding and entel:ing new regions. 
Prior to the emergence of superstores in the mid-1980s, businesses and 
consumers typically purchased office supplies through dealers that offered 
items listed in a catalog published by one of several oHice supply whole-
salers. 'Dlese dealers also often operated small storefronts in whieh some 
of the most popular items were kept in inventory for spot sales to end 
users.37) 
On April 10, 1997 the Federal Trade Commission (fTC) filed suit to 
obtain an injunetion prohibiting Staples and Office Depot from consum-
mating the aequisition. In filing suit the Commission rejected an offer by 
36) 'l1lis section was in part adapted. with permissiotn. from 'Sea-Change' or 'SllbmaTkels?' Fed-
eml Trade Commission .... Staples. Inc. (Illd Office DepOT, III c., by Alan S. Frankel and Jam"s A. Lan-
genfeld. Global Competition Heview. June/July ]997 at 29. 
37) Both Staples and Office Ikpot began operation in 1986. 'Illcse retailers followed a new 
strategy. albeit one evident in many sectors of American retailing. While traditional channels of dis-
trihution emphasized varif,t)' and enhanced service (for example, olTering next-moruing ddivcry of 
omce supplies to the customer) superstores targeted small husiness and home office customers that 
were especially price sensitive, along with other customers who preferred the availahility of a large 
number of items on-site for some or all of their purchases. 
The superstore ehains constructed large. efficient warehouse-style stores in which roughly ] 0,000 
individual products were offered for sale. Though this fell far short of the variety offered by tradi-
tional \vholesalers with their massive catalogs, the resulting cost savings on thest~ popular items (due 
in part to favorable discounts negotiated with vendors eager to have their brand sold in a limited-
selection environment) were passed <lIong to consumers in the form of lower prices. In the years 
since the creation of this new format. sup"rstores as a whole haH' grown rapidly at the expense of 
lllany slllall dealers and their supplif>rs. Yet, today most consumable office supplies used in the 
United States are sold through other channels, including traditional distrilliltors and their dealers, 
contract stationers, mass merchandisers weh as \VaIMart, and others, as well and directly to large 
corporate users. 
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Staples to divest up to 63 stores to Office Max as a condition for permit-
ting the acquisition to proceed. Because the U.S. antitrust agencies typi-
cally settle merger challenges with this type of consent agreement, many 
were surprised that the FTC rejected Staples' oHer. 
At its heart, the I'TC's case relied primarily upon the companies' docu-
ments and statistical evidence that the FTC believed demonstrate that 
Staples and Office Depot are particularly close competitors. The FTC's 
analysis showed that, in geographic markets {metropolitan areas} in which 
the two firms compete with one another, office supply prices are signifi-
cantly lower than in areas in which only one or the other competes. 
Furthermore, the FTC claimed that its evidence showed that even a 
reduction in the number of superstores from three to two in a metropoli-
tan area would push up prices, and that in other markets apparently 
unaffected by the merger these two firms were the most likely source of 
additional future competition. The FTC concluded that the relevant prod-
uct market included only "the sale of office supplies through office super-
stores" and that there was "a substantial likelihood the acquisition may 
lessen competition in violation of Section 7 [of the Clayton Act]." 
Staples and Office Depot filed a joint reply to the FTC's brief in this 
ease in which they called the FTC's relevant market definition "gerry-
d [ J] " U • 1"" 'f-' I" I ,. " Ad' S man er ef ,"contnve(', art! ICIa " anc 'procrustean. . ceor mg to ta-
pIes and Office Depot, this would have been a combination between two 
retailers that together account for only 5.5 percent of total annual sales 
of office supply products in the United States and, by merging their oper-
ations, the combined entity would have achieved significant efficiencies 
that will be passed along to the public in the form of lower prices.:lB) 
Public reaction to the FTC's challenge of this proposed transaction was 
anything but muted. An artiele in the Economist stated, "the FTC's 
attempt to redefine and narrow the market is deeply flawed.'\l'i) The New 
York Times called the case "a sea change in policy."·H!) Lurking just 
behind the scenesll) was an enormous amount of interest recently at the 
:38) The parties pointed to their track record of reducing prices and the continuous declilw in 
office supply prices cv("u as the number of competing chains has diminished 1 as sllpporting evidence. 
The companies responded to the FJ'C's statistical study of tlw relationship between price and he"d-
to-head slIper,tore competition with two principal criticisms. First, they claimed that the FJ'Cs 
results w,'n' an artifact of tlw particular set of "ffic,' supply produds the FI'Cs '>xpert rhose to ana-
lyze. Second. they argued that the I'TC's results do not properly take into account tll(' fact that tlw 
cities in which higher prices were found tend to correspond to eities in ,,,,hieh tht' cost of doing 
business generally is hight'f. 
39) A Ca.,,, of" Office Block. Economist. March I;', 1997, 1'.65. 
40) A Sea-Change in Policy b)' the Trllstbusters, N,'w York Times. ~larch 20. 1997. 
en) Perhaps this iSSIH' was not lurking at all. Staples and Office Depot called this a "tr:st cas,," 
that advances (onorel'l and ;"misguided~l legal and cronomic theories. 
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FTC in unilateral effects theories. 
Both the FfC and the parties agreed that the advent of superstores has 
brought systematically lower prices to office supply consumers. f2 ) Staples 
and Office Depot argued that their merger will permit more of the same, 
while the FTC argued that the very cost and price reductions caused by 
superstores had, in effect, turned the format into its own relevant market. 
In general, the economic analysis underlying "unilateral effects" theo-
ries aims to determine whether prices will rise following a merger, 
regardless of the market definition employed. Yet, price increases follow-
ing a hypothetical merger is precisely the basis for market definition itself 
under the Merger Guidelines, and the economic arguments in the Staples 
case wrJ"c primarily foclIscd on market definition. 
According to the Guidelines, "the Agency will delin(~ate the product 
market to be a product or group of products such that a hypothetical 
profit-maximizing firm that was the only present and future seller of 
those products ('monopolist') likely would impose at least a 'small but sig-
nificant and nontransitory' increase in price. "13) Thus, according to the 
logic of the Guidelines themselves, the FTC's determination that prices 
would rise following the Staples merger under a unilateral effects theory 
were rquivalent to the FTC's determination that the relevant market 
includes only the products of the merging firms. 
'l1lere was a convenient distinl:,)"uishing characteristic in this case -the 
'superstore' format and designation - that minimizes any seeming disparity 
between these two aspects of merger analysis and cloaked the unilateral 
effects arguments under the traditional language of market definition. On 
its face Staples/OfJice Depot illustrates the general tendency of O.S. com-
petition agencies in recent years to focus on anticompetitive effects 
involving either relatively narrower markets than in the past. 
'Ine court in Staples agreed with the Federal 'Ihde Commission, and 
blocked the merger ... l ) The court in large part used the Brown Shoe crite-
ria in its determination of market definition. In particular, the court 
interpreted the FJ'C's "pricing evidence" as Brown Shoe:~ "sensitivity to 
priee change", and viewed the vastly larger number of disposable office 
products offered by office superstores and their unique format as Brown 
Shoe:~ "practical indicia" of a market. 
The Federal Trade Commission and the court apparently relied heavily 
·t·2) This i~ tru(' for Illany catt~gorit.'s of prodllds carried by" lhe superstol'l:s. 
·B) D.~partnwnl of ./'bti('(' And F.,dt",,1 Trad" (mBmi"ioll I/orizontal ~l('rg"r (;lIideli,l"s. April 2, 
1992. Section 1.1l. 
.j .. J.) Fed t'l"a I 'Ibdl' COlllllli'Sioll ,'. Staples. In('. and Office Depot. Illc. Ci.S.D.C. for j)istrict of 
Columbia. <:i\'. No. tJ7-701 (TFI/) JUIlt' 30. 1997. 
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on statistical analyses of price comparisons across different geographic 
markets in showing that Staples' prices were about thirteen percent 
higher in cities with one chain superstore than where there were three 
superstores, as well as evidence from the parties' documents that sup-
ported this conclusion. This evidence arguably answers the ultimate ques-
tion of whether reducing the number of office superstores would result in 
higher prices to consumers, regardless of the exact dimensions of the rel-
evant product market. However, both the Commission and the court did 
not use the Commission's statistical analysis to try to discard traditional 
market definition. According to the Commission's Chairman Pitofsky, the 
court instead used the results of its price comparisons to infer indirectly 
its asserted market definition of office superstores: 
In my view, the Court appropriately found that office supply super 
stores do business in a sufJiciently special way that they constitute a 
separate product market-not a submarket but a market. The econo-
metric evidence showed that there was cross elasticity of demand 
among customers of the various super stores - hence prices were low-
est when super stores met each other in the same geographic mar-
ket - but there was relatively little cross elasticity bet ween the super 
stores and other sources of consumable office supplies. In that view, 
the econometric evidence demonstrated the existence of a separate 
relevant market, and was not a technique whereby the government 
could avoid its obligation to demonstrate the existence of a markd. I") 
In sum, Staples illustrates that U.S. antitrust agencies an~ actively using 
unilateral effects analyses and sophisticated econometric techniques ill 
their evaluation of whether to challenge a merger and have successfully 
used these techniques (in conjunction with more traditional evidence) 
successfully in litigation. The evidence, however, has been placed in the 
context of traditional antitrust analysis of market definition and market 
structure - in effect inferring the traditional structural analysis from the 
direct evidenee of increased concentration leading to higher prices. 
VIII. U.S. v. Engelhard 
Issues of the appropriate economic analysis and the relevance of the 
merging firms being dosest competitors have been explored in sev(~ral 
45) Hobert Pitofsh. Staples find Jioeing: What Ihe,' say Aboul .11erl'eT" EII/iJrcemml al Ihe FTC. 
Speeeh given at Antitrusl 1998, Busill";;' Dc\'dopnwllt ..\;;sociates. 912;J/')i. 
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other litigated mergers, even ones that have not relied on complex statis-
tical and simulation techniques. In some of these recent mergers, such as 
U.S. v. Engelhard, the approach taken by the antitrust agencies have not 
always found favor in the courts. 
The Court in Staples explicitly adopted the Merger Guidelines' usual 
market definition test of a price difference being greater than 5 percent 
as the benchmark for determining whether these price difJerences were 
significant enough to establish a separate product market given the docu-
mentation and statistical evidence in that case. t6) In contrast to the Sta-
ples decision, however, the District Court for the Middle Distriet of Geor-
gia, disagreed with the U.S. Department of Justice's applieation of the 
Mngf'r Guidelines in United States 1'. Engelhard, 970 F. Supp. 14.6.3 
(1997). In Engelhard, the DOJ sought to bloek Englehard's acquisition of 
Floridin because the DOJ believed that "the transaction would reduce the 
number of competitors in the U.s. gel cla'y market from three to twO".17) 
Both eompanies mine, process, and distribute gellant quality attapulgite 
("GQA") and sorbent quality attapulgite ("sorbent clay"), which are found 
tog(~ther in the same locations along the Georgia-Florida bonier. 
Processed GQA is a thickener and suspension agent that has many cnd 
uses, including fertilizers, animal feeds, paints, drilling i1uids, asbestos-free 
asphalt roof coatings, tape joint compounds, and molecular sieves. GQA 
was the focus of the DOl's challenge, and sorbent clay was not chal-
lenged because "there is vigorous competition between sorbent clay and 
non-attapulgite products. 18) 
In determining the bounds of the relevant product market, the DOJ 
and its expcrts used the approach outlined in the Merger Guidelines to 
show the magnitude of "cross-elastieity of demand" and "reasonable 
interchangeablility. ", but presented no statistical or simulation evidence 
(presumably because of a lack of data). Instead, one of the DOJ's expert 
witnesses interviewed many existing customers of Englehard and Floridin 
representing almost all of the end uses GQA, asking whether they would 
switch for a 5 or 10 percent price increase in GQA. In addition, direct 
evidence from a number of customers was introduced asking the same 
question. In general, the customers said they would not switch to other 
products for a .5 to ] 0 percent price increase in GQA. 
The court explicitly disagreed with the DOrs and its expert's lise of 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines' 5 to 10 percent price increase test on 
·1-6) See fOlltnote Il al 16 . 
. 1-7) Jd. al H6:, (emphasis added). 
1-1l) frl. at ]·1.66 n. 5. 
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GQA for determining whether customers would substitute other products 
in sufficient numbers to make sueh a price increase unprofitable and, 
thus, excluding other products from the relevant product market defini-
tion. The court quoted the Guidelines for the proposition that the 
"Guidelines are not binding on the courts. "19) The court recognized that 
"in many eases faithful application of the 5%-10% test will, in fact, result 
in an accurate description of the relevant market."50) However, the court 
rejected its applicability to this merger for several reasons. 
Fin;l, the court noted that CQA accounted for only between 1110 and 
10 percent of the total cost of the final produet in which it is an ingredi-
ent.51) Accordingly, a 5 to 10 percent price increase would only raise the 
price of the final good by about, 25 percent if the GQA formed 5 percent 
of the cost of the final good. Since most products in which GQA is used 
as an ingredient would require significant reformulation costs, the Court 
found that a price test of this magnitude did not reflect "market reali-
ties."S2) Perhaps the key insight on which the court based this evaluation 
carne from the faet that 
[S]imply changing GQA suppliers would require product testing and 
potential reformulation .... In the light of the low cost of GQA as a 
percentage of thcir overall product cost and the potential for signiii-
cant qualification costs, some customers stated that they would not 
switch from Engelhard GQA to Floridin GQA, or visa versa, if their 
present supplier raised the price by 5 or 10 percent. ... Such a con-
clusion would reflect the notion that only physically identical prod-
ucts could be in the same market. The Supreme Court has rejected 
such a position, Du Pont, supra, 351 u.s. at 394, 76 S.Ct. at 
1006-07.5:l ) 
Given that it would take more than a 5 to 10 percent price increase 
before customers would switch between Engelhard's and Floridin's prod-
ucts, the Court believed that a higher price increase test would be neces-
sary to establish whether other products experienced the same level of 
substitutability as that of the merging firms' GQA. 
In addition to this criticism of the DOl's and its experts' approach to 
market definition, the court also faulted them for only gathering evidence 
49) Id. at 1467. 
50) Id. 
51) Id. 
52) Id. at 14·6B. 
53) Id. (footnote omitted). 
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on current purchasers of GQA, "ignoring perhaps the best source of 
information GQA relevant to the product market inquiry, to wit: those 
customers who have already switched to an alternative product. "51) 'The 
court also found that the 5 to 10 percent price increase test competition 
exists only in the post formulation stage, when GQA had already been 
chosen for an end-use produet. Accordingly, the court faulted the test 
applied to existing GQA eustomers for not taking into aecount that poten-
tial customers eould use an alternative substance for the same function 
when ereating a new product or retooling an older one. 55) Finally, the 
court specifieally found that sepiolate was a good substitute for GQA, at 
least in the western portion of the U.S. where the deposits are located, 
based on testimony and documentary f~videllce.5iJ) 
AJter considering the evidence in detail, the Engelhard eourt eoneluded 
that the evidence did not weigh in favor of finding that the rekvant 
product market was gel quality attapulgite. The court coneluded that the 
evidence was insufficient to make any judgment on the relevant market, 
so the DO.1 had failed to carry its burden of persuasion for an essential 
element of the caseY) 
IX. Conelusions from Staples and Engelhard 
These two decisions provide some lessons in applying the eeonomie 
concepts embodied in the Merger Guidelines to market definition and the 
agencies' inereased interest in determining the ultimale impact of amerger 
on consumers. First, both cases suggest that economic substitutability, 
rather than physical interchangeably, is the key to product market defini-
tion. Second, in addition to the Merger Guidelines' use of priee inerease 
and eross elastieity of demand tests, the courts will use other indicia of 
market definition to confirm the relevant product market before reaching 
any conelusion. Third, the use of a 5 to 10 percent price increase test to 
lIuantify the degree of economically substitutability cannot he assumed 
automatically. If it would take more than a 5 to 10 percent price increase 
on the products of one of the merging firms to lead customers to switch 
to the products of the other merging firm, courts might require a higher 
price increase threshold for estahlishing whether the products of non-
merging firms should be included in the relevant market. 
S·l) fr!. at j·j.h9. 
;is) ld. at IUj<). 
Sh) fr!. at HilI-lB. 
')7) fr!. at 11.8·1-115. 
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X. The Use of Customer Complaints in Merger Analysis 
As indicated in the cases discussed above, the lJ. S. antitrust agencJ(~s 
will lise complex statistical evidence or more qualitative evidence gath-
ered from many sources-especially customers. Because, customers can 
provide useful information to the enforcers in merger investigations, so 
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission always 
interview customers in these investigations. Customers usually know a 
great deal about the nature of competition among their suppliers, and 
often have the incentive to oppose actions that will reduce completion. 
Accordingly, customer complaints may be given substantial weight, and 
can shape some of the basic arguments in antitrust litigation. In a merger 
case where customers express opposition, the defense must argue that the 
complainants are not well-informed, or are not expressing concerns about 
the relevant antitrust issues. Similarly, if customers generally express 
indifference or support a merger, tbe plaintiff must argue that customers 
will be affected adversely, but are not aware of the losses they are likely 
to incur. 
It is clear that opinions cannot take tbe place of detailed antitrust 
analysis. In some instances, customers may be affected, or perceive that 
they will be affected, by factors otber than changes in the degree of com-
petition. In other eases, customers' concerns may be prejudiced by a lack 
of current information. Sometimes customers speak witb a multitude of 
voices, making dear interpretation more difficult. Other times in gather-
ing information to make a case, plaintiffs may not obtain a full picture of 
customer opinions. Aecordingly, it is important to learn eomplaining eus-
tomeI's' knowledge of the industry, to ensure that full information has 
been obtained from customers, and to determine the motivating forces 
behind their opposition. These considerations necessitate careful evalua-
tion of apparent customer complaints as the Department of Justice 
learned the hard way in its loss in Engelhand. We will first discuss prob-
lems w·ith customers being adequately informed to provide useful infor-
mation, tben discuss motivations of customers tbat could bias tbeir 
responses, and finally doscribe some problems with obtaining accurate 
information from customers. 
1() determine the depth of a customer's knowledge and the motivations 
for his concerns, antitrust investigators often ask the customer hypotheti-
cal questions. Tbese questions are difTicult to answer in some situations. 
For example, in order to determine whether cuustomers could defeat an 
attempted anti competitive price increase, investigators may ask customers 
what products would be dose substitutes for the merging firms' products 
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if there were a price increase. A customer may be aware of the products 
that are close substitutes at current prices, but not higher prices, if it has 
ever had to confront those prices. Without higher prices, the customer 
may have lacked the ineentive to incur the costs necessary to evaluate 
potential alternatives, including the possibility of vertically integrating into 
that input market. Customers are most likely to be knowledgeable about 
substitutes at different levels of rclative prices if they have faced price 
fluctuations in the past. 
In Engle/wrd, the customers stated they would not switch to other sub-
stitutes unless there were substantially higher prices. However, the cus-
tomers also stated that they would not substitute between the products of 
the merging firms without there same higher prices. In effect the DO.J 
did not adequately take into account that the two merging firms were just 
as good (or as poor) substitutes for each other as other product in the 
customers' eyes. In this situation, the customers' opinions not only under-
mined the notion that Engelhard and Floridin were "closest competitors" 
but undermined the market definition argued by the DO.J. 
Some customers' knowledge of substitutes also may he limited because 
they have not conducted a recent search, and their information about 
substitutes may not be current. Often a complaining customcr, when 
questioned about substitutes, will admit having limited information about 
his supplier's competitors, in part due to his long relationship with the 
acquired firm. Complaints from customers with such limited information 
seldom offer convincing support for an antitrust caseyl) 
Customers may also be myopic in that they often focus on their portion 
of the market, and not include all the firms or products that affect com-
petition. For example, non-integrated retailers facing a merger between 
two of their wholesale suppliers may be concerned that the merger could 
lead to a wholesale price increase, which would place them at a competi-
tive disadvantage relative to their intet,'Tated rivals. However, if only thc 
non-integrated retailers are subject to a potential wholesale price increase, 
then such a price increase is less likely than if the price increase would 
be industry-wide. Competition from the vertically integrated firms in the 
final good market of1en make in unprofitable for the wholesalers to 
,SB) This lack of information is particularly a concern \\:}wn f'lIstollwr::; de;o;crihe the acquin~d firm 
as the industry "m'n·C'rick.'" with tlw low('s! pri".,s and highest Ijuality products. The",' customers 
sonwtinH~S are conccrned that tht> takeon'r of t.hpir :-lupplipr will result in a }'(~ducti()n in competition 
iwc<llls(' tlwy I)prct~iye their ;o;lIppli,>r to Iw a uniqUl~ly important compditi\'t>' forl'e, However. CllS-
tOllwr:.; of competing firm;.; oflf'll des(~rilw tlwir own suppliers a~ the low-prict', high-quality supplit:r. 
This should no! be surprising, b('cause tI](' lwrception of rdatiwlv low prices and high Ijuality 1'1"1'-
",malll" It'ad customers !o mak., their purchases from a particular supplier. 
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increase prices to non-integrated retailers, because such a price mcrease 
would reduce wholesaler sales. 
Other limitations on their information may inhibit their evaluation of 
the competitive consequences of mergers. For example, customers observe 
the prices they pay their suppliers, but they have limited information 
about their suppliers' costs and markups. Whether or not customers 
perceive that they are able to get a "good deal" is not necessarily indi-
cative of the extent to which suppliers' markups over unit cost are 
competitive.'i9) 
Customers' limited knowledge of suppliers' costs also implies that they 
may not be knowledgeable about some aspects of the ease of entry into 
their suppliers' market, as well as the ease of production substitution of 
existing capacity of firms not currently producing the relevant product. 
Entry may appear to be difficult because no entry has occurred in many 
years. However, this lack of entry may be due to the market being highly 
competitive and entry not being profitable, rather than because entry bar-
riers enable incumbents to charge anticompetitive prices. These alterna-
tive conclusions obviously have divergent implications for antitrust 
enforcement. 
Even when customers have substantial information about the markeL 
they may be biased against a merger. For example, some customers may 
oppose all mergers because of perceived social consequences, such worker 
displacement, that are not related to market power. Moreover, some cus-
tomers may also be competitors, which clearly can affect their incentives 
for opposing a merger. A distributor may be a customer of a manufac-
turer, but may also compete with the manufacturer is that engages in 
direct distribution. To the extent that an integrated manufacturer is 
ac(}uiring a manufacturer that only uses independent distributors. one will 
almost always find the independent distributors objecting to the merger. 
However, if independent distributors are efficient and there is competition 
at the manufacturing and distribution levels, it is very unlikely that the 
distributors' concerns reflect true competitive concerns. Instead, these 
distributors may really be concerned that the merger will create a more 
effieient competitor at the distribution level. 
59) In particular, customers usually have limited access to information about their ,uppliers' 
production process (as opposed to its distribution. marketing, etc.) and may not recognize production 
efficiencies from a merger or an inter-supplier agreement. Although they may he more familiar with 
tlwir suppliers' marketing and distribution, customers may not know the cost savings that might b" 
aehi(~\'ed in these areas either. As such, customers may be unahle to recognize cost savings that 
could I", passed on to th('m in the form of improved produc!,; or lower prices. 
Hobert H. Lande and .lames Langenfeld 
Other customers may express OppositIOn to mergers because there are 
adjustment costs associated with new management. Merged firms may 
make changes in their product, servicing, ordering procedures, delivery 
procedures, and payment requirements. Customers often face the costs of 
learning about the changes and of changing their own operations to con-
form with the supplier's changes. Customers sometimes describe these 
costs as "disrupting established business relationships." These are real 
costs borne by customers, but they may be necessary for a transition 
toward a more efficient system of exchange between supplier and cus-
tomer. In addition, the changes may have been necessary even without 
thc merger for the acquired firm to remain competitive. The appropriate 
comparison, which customers may not have sufficient information to 
make, is hdween alternative future systems, and not between past and 
future systems.60) 
Similar to adjustment costs that customers may bear after a supplier 
merger, customers may be concerned about "switching costs" that they 
incur when they change suppliers. Customers often have some assets that 
are valuahle only if they purchase from a particular supplier, and switch-
ing may necessitate the costs of purchasing new assets that are specific 
to the new supplier. However, if the cost of switching to another supplicr 
is the same as the cost of switching between the merger partners, then 
the level of switching costs has no effect on the potential market power 
that could be created by the merger, as the court recognized in U.S. v. 
Engelhard. 
Given the potential incentives of some customers, a complete investiga-
tion should also seek information from non-complaining customers can 
provide useful information. Non-complaining customers may provide 
important counter-arguments to the eoneerns expressed by complaining 
customers, and may viewed as less biased that either complaining cus-
tomers or the parties involved in a merger. 
Even when cutilumer,; are informed and are nul hia,;ed, the gaLllering 
of information on customer complaints can result in an inaccurate picture 
of the competitive impact of a merger. For example, the means by which 
(0) In sonw iJl:-itaJlce~. custolllers may 1)(' abl(~ to f()re~l~(~ adjustmf'llt co:-,ts. but III1<1bl" to a(h~­
'I"atd), fon'",,' lilt' a;socialt·d h .. nefits. In particlllar, th .. position of til<' interyi .. "",,, at tl](' linn may 
bias that person":-, PC"ITt'ptions of the ('ost:o:; and benefits of a supplier merger. TIl(' malUll!Pf of th(' 
finn's purchasing deparlnH,nt may have til" most informalion abolll Ih,> linn's slIppliers, bllt may 
have strolll! COllet'rns ahou1 adjllstnll'nt {'ost~ I)f>('allsl~ those ('o:-;ts may fall Iwavily on the purchasing 
departlllent. The firm:s pn'sid(~nt~ howevl'r. may h<.l\'e a hroad(~r perspt'divp on the impact of costs 
and Iwrlt'Jits on th .. firm '" a whole. lIis opinion cOllld 1)(' mon, vaillable. IInle" 11<' has such limited 
information ahollt tlw day to day workings of tlw competitIoll among: the firm 1:; :;upplieI"s that Ill' 
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customer complaints come to the attention of the merg(~r enforcers can 
result in a biased sample of opinions. A range of degrees of competitive· 
concern are likely to exist among customers for any given horizontal 
merger. Of course, those customers with thc strongest coneerns about the 
merger are most likely to contact a government agency or to agree to be 
interviewed when contacted by an agency. However, antitrust investigators 
may contact numerous customers and locate only a few with eompetitive 
concerns. Thus the existence of apparently relevant competitive eom-
plaints should be considered to be much less important than the percent-
age of well supported complaints from a random sample of customers. 
As suggested in this discussion, complainants may have a number of 
sources of concern and it is difficult to know the relative importance of 
eaeh concern. A customer could oppose a merger for several reasons-
e.g., ideological reasons, the expectation of adjustment costs, and the pos-
sibility of anticompetitive effects. Accordingly, it is important not to focus 
exclusively on competitive concerns, because they may be a minor reason 
for a customer's complaint. Merger investigations that involve customer 
eomplaints should probe all the motivations for customer concerns to 
determine the relative importance of competitive concerns. Absent a care-
ful analysis of custon1(~r opinions and their bases, the use of customer 
information can cut against antitrust enforcers in applying the new eco-
nomic theories, as happened in Engelhard. 
XI. Clarifying Poliey 
In the United States the role of economic analysis in merger cases has 
grown so much that it is now of paramount importanee. 'nH~ very influ-
(~ntial fed(~ral Ml'rgl'r Guiddines, which an' haspd upon and r<~pletp with 
complex economie ideas, have helped this occur. At its most general level 
the parameters of merger analysis arc, of course, established by the U.S. 
statutory framework and case law. Under the relevant case law this analy-
sis has become increasingly complex. Merger analysis, as influenced by 
the Federal Merger Guidelines, has now evolved to the point where it 
consists of little more that a "safe harbor" for small mergers in uncon-
centrated markets, and for all other mergers a full rule of reason inquiry 
into every factor that conceivably could affect the final price of the prod-
ucts or services in question. This rule of reason inquiry is performed 
almost entirely by the use of economic analysis, based on sophisticated 
quantitative techniques to qualitatively analyzed customer opinions. How-
ever, much of this analysis is placed in the terms of traditional legal 
analysis (such as the requirement of market definition). 
Rohert H. Lande and James Langenfeld N(JCL 
As the Staples/Office Depot transaction illustrates, the latest step in this 
trend has been the increased attention given by the antitrust enforcers 
into the question of whether horizontal mergers might give rise to anti-
competitive unilateral effects. The enforcers have madc a number of sig-
nificant advances in the development of the optimal theoretical approach 
towards this issue. But in at least one significant respect these advances 
have come at the expense of predietability and business certainty. The 
models that the antitrust enforcers utilize often predict possible price 
increases when extremely small firms merge. This has the effect of efIec-
tively limiting the "safe harbors" contained in the Guidelines, especially 
to the extent that economic analysis is used to define narrower markets. 
The ivlerger Guidelines should contain reasonably large safe harbors so 
that they can assure a more significant number of transactions that they 
will not be challenged. Specifically, we believe that business needs an 
explicit safe harbor from unilateral effects analysis. Because a 35 percent 
post-merger market share does not appear to be a safe harbor threshold, 
and these theories have not yet been tested often in court in their most 
naked form, the government should more clearly articulate its standards 
until these theories have been litigated more thoroughly. 
Further, because the new models almost always predict some price 
increase, it also would be desirable for the agencies to specify what they 
consider an allowable (or de minimis) predicted price increase. This is 
particularly important because the authors' experiences suggest have been 
reluctant to accept any predicted price increase resulting from a merger. 
Descriptions of the rationale for bringing specific cases are extremely 
helpful.(>!) However, it is still difficult to generalize from this type of dis-
cussion and to provide a reasonably high level of certainty when counsel-
lllg many prospective mergers, absent extensive and expensive economic 
analysis. 
(1) For ,·xampk see I'ito[,ky. s"pra not'· ·j·S. and Jonathan B. Bakpr. CIli/olerai COlllpe1ilil'e 
F/(ec1s 7711'ories ill JINger ..IlllIiYSi.l, II .. hltitrust 21 (l9'J7). 
